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If Not EEA State Liability, Then What? Reflections Ten
Years after the EFTA Court's Sveinbji'rnsddttirRuling*
Carl Baudenbacher

**

I. INTRODUCTION
On 10 December 1998, the European Free Trade Association ("EFTA")
Court held in its landmark ruling in Case E-9/97 Sveinbjrnsddttir that State
liability was part of European Economic Area ("EEA") law. With this, the
EFTA Court decided one of the most controversial questions of EEA law. The
present article first discusses the scope and aim of the EEA Agreement and the
recognition of State liability in Community law. It then analyzes the case law of
the EFTA Court and its acceptance by the Court of Justice of the European
Communities ("ECJ') and the Supreme Courts and governments of the EFTA
States. It concludes that had the EFTA Court not taken that step ten years ago,
the EEA Agreement would have become one-sided, with unequal protection of
individual rights in the European Community ("EC") and the EFTA pillar. The
author has served as a judge of the EFTA Court since 1995 and as its president
since 2003. He has participated in Sveinbjirnsddttir as well as in all the following
State liability cases the EFTA Court has decided.
In October 1991, the negotiations on the EEA Agreement between the
then twelve member states of the EC and the then seven EFTA states were
informally concluded. The aim of the Agreement was to extend the EC single
market to the EFTA States. According to this first draft, the EEA was to be
based on a two-pillar system with the law of both pillars, EC and EFTA, being
identical in substance but each having its own enforcement institutions. The ECJ
was to govern the EC pillar. The EFTA pillar would be governed by a common
EEA Court, consisting of five ECJ judges and three judges from EFTA
countries, and a common EEA Court of First Instance made up of two ECJ
An earlier version of this article was published in S. Katuoka, ed, Teise besikeicianioje Europoje: fber
amicorum PranasKins 545 (Mykolo Romerio 2008).
President of the EFTA Court, Director of the Institute of European and International Law at the
University of St. Gallen.
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judges and three judges from EFTA countries. The main function of the EEA
courts was to ensure that the case law in the EFTA pillar developed
homogeneously with the practice of the ECJ. However, the ECJ later declared
the proposed EEA judicial system incompatible with Community law.'
Comparing the aims and the context of the EEA Agreement with those of
Community law, the ECJ found that the objectives of the Community legal
order went beyond the objectives of the Agreement and that the context also
differed. According to the ECJ, the EEA was to be established on the basis of
an international treaty which merely created rights and obligations between the
contracting parties.' The ECJ held that the EC Treaty, by contrast, established a
new legal order for the benefit of which the States have limited their sovereignty
rights, and that the subjects of the new legal order comprise not only the States,
but also their nationals, with the essential features being direct effect and
primacy. Direct effect means that citizens and economic operators are able to
invoke provisions of an international treaty before a court of a Member State if
certain conditions are fulfilled. Such provisions take primacy over conflicting
provisions of the domestic law of the Member States. These two principles had
been recognized by the ECJ as early as 1963' and 1964. 4
On the basis of this comparison, the ECJ concluded that identical wording
of EC and EEA law was no guarantee of homogeneity. Since there were no other
mechanisms that would secure homogeneity, the ECJ did not consider the
fundamental principles of direct effect and primacy to be safeguarded.' On the
contrary, it assumed that these principles were "irreconcilable with the
characteristics of the [EEA] agreement. ' 6 The final conclusion was therefore that
"the divergences which exist between the aims and context of the agreement, on
the one hand, and the aims and context of Community law, on the other, stand in
the way of the achievement of the objective of homogeneity in the interpretation
and application of the law in the EEA. ' '7 As a consequence of ECJ Opinion 1/91,
a new version of the institutional chapter of the EEA Agreement was

I

See generally Draft agreement between the Communiy, on the one hand, and the countries of the European Free
Trade Association, on the other, relaingto the reation of the EuropeanEconomicArea, Opinion 1/91, 1991 ECR
1-6079 (Dec 14, 1991) ("Opinion 1/91').

2

Id,

3

NV Algemene Transport-En Expediie Ondememing van Gend & Loos v Nederlandse Administraie de
Belastingen,Case C-26/62, 1963 ECR 3, § 1H.B (Feb 5, 1963).

4

Flaminio Costa vENEL, Case C-6/64, 1964 ECR 585 July 15, 1964).

s

Opinion 1/91, 1991 ECR,

6

Id,

7

Id, 29.

20.

5-29.

28.
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negotiated, which provided for the establishment of a structurally independent
EFTA Court.!
II. RECOGNITION OF STATE LIABILITY IN COMMUNITY LAW
A. BREAKTHROUGH IN FRANCOVICH
In view of the fears of the lack of direct effect and primacy of EEA law
expressed in Opinion 1/91, it must be noted that less than one month earlier,
the ECJ concluded in Andrea Francovich and Danila Bonifad and others v Itay that
State liability for the loss and damage caused to individuals by breaches of
European Community law is a principle "inherent" to the system of the EC
Treaty.9
In Francovich, the issue was that Italy had not implemented Council
Directive 80/897, which provided protection to employees in the event of the
insolvency of their employer, a failure that had been confirmed by the ECJ. 10
Two Italian courts had referred to the ECJ for a preliminary ruling the question
of whether the country was required to pay compensation for damage caused to
workers by this failure." The ECJ held that this question was to be considered in12
light of the general system and fundamental principles of the EC Treaty.
Referring in particular to its jurisprudence in van Gend en Loos,"3 Costa v ENEL, 4
and Simmenthal,5 the ECJ began its reasoning by recalling that (1) the EC Treaty
created its own legal system whose subjects are not only the Member States but
also the Member States' nationals, and (2) that national courts must ensure that
the applicable provisions of Community law take full effect and protect the
rights which they confer on individuals.' 6 The ECJ held that "[t]he full
effectiveness of Community rules would be impaired and the protection of the
rights which they grant would be weakened if individuals were unable to obtain
redress when their rights are infringed by a breach of Community law for which

8

See Agreement on the European Economic Area (May 2, 1992), OJ (L 1) 3, art 108(2) (Jan 3,
1994).

9
10
n
12

Andrea Francozich and Danila Bonifad and others v Ita#, Joined Cases C-6/90 and C-9/90, 1991 ECR I5357,
33-35 (Nov 19,1991).
See generally Commission v Itay, Case C-22/87, 1989 ECR 143 (Feb 2, 1989).
Francovicb, 1991 ECR 1-5357,
Id, 28-30.

7.

13 NVAgemene Tranaport,1963 ECR, § H.B.
14 Flaminio Costa v ENEL, 1964 ECR, 1141.
15 Amministraone delle
Finane dello Stato vSimmentbalSpA, Case C-106/77, 1978 ECR 629 (Mar 9, 1978).
16 Francovicb, 1991 ECR 1-5357,
31-32.
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a Member State can be held responsible."' 7 It concluded that this principle was
"inherent in the system of the Treaty,"' 8 and added that a further basis was to be
found in the duty of loyal cooperation of the Member States laid down in Article
5 EC (now Article 10 EC).' 9 The argument of Germany, the United Kingdom,
Italy and the Netherlands, that the question of whether possible actions against
the State for reparation may be brought was a matter of national law, remained
unsuccessful.2 °
After stating that State liability was required by Community law, the ECJ
found that "the conditions under which that liability gives rise to a right to
reparation depend on the nature of the breach of Community law giving rise to
It then defined three conditions for liability in cases of
the loss and damage.'
non-implementation of a directive: (1) the result prescribed by the directive
should entail the grant of rights to individuals, (2) it should be possible to
identify the content of those rights on the basis of the provisions of the
directive, and (3) a causal link must exist between the breach of the State's
obligation and the loss and damage suffered by the injured party. 22 With this, a
foundation was laid for State liability, but important questions remained open.
B. CONFIRMATION AND AMPLIFICATION IN BRASSERIE DU
PJ CHEUR
On March 5, 1996, the ECJ handed down a second landmark ruling on
State liability in Joined Cases Brasserie du Picheur and Factortame.23 It had
previously found German statutory rules on the marketing of beer and British
conditions relating to the registration of vessels to be in conflict with the Treaty
rules on free movement of goods and freedom of establishment.24 The ECJ
rejected the argument put forward by the German, Irish, and Dutch
governments that State liability occurs only where the provisions breached are
not directly effective.25 Instead, the ECJ held that there may be cases, such as
17

Id, 33.

18

Id,

35.

19

See id, 136.

20

See Francovicb, 1991 ECR 1-5357,

21

Francoicb,1991 ECR 1-5357,

22

Id, 40.
Braseie du Picbeur SA v Germany, The Queen v Secretagy of Statefor Tranport, ex parte Factortame, Ld,

23
24

25

43 (Opinion of Advocate General Mischo).

38.

Joined Cases C-46/93 and C-48/93, 1996 ECR 1-1029 (Mar 5, 1996).
See Commission v United Kingdom, Case C-246/89, 1991 ECR 1-4585, 39 (Oct 4, 1991); The Queen v
Secretay of Statefor Transport, exparne FactorameLid and others, Case C-221/89, 1991 ECR 1-3905, 39
(July 25, 1991); Commirsion v Germany, Case C-178/84, 1987 ECR 1227,T 54 (Mar 12,1987).
Brasserie du Picheurand Factortame,1996 ECR 1-1029,

18-19.
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Francovich, in which the provisions of a non-implemented directive lack direct
effect, so that reparation has the function of redressing the injurious
consequences of a Member state's failure to transpose the directive.26 Reparation
may, however, also be a necessary corollary of the direct effect of the
Community provision whose breach has caused the damage.
The ECJ also rejected the argument put forward by the German
government
that a general right to reparation for individuals could be created only by
legislation and that for such a right to be recognized by judicial decision
would be incompatible with the allocation of powers as between the
Community institutions and the Member States and with the institutional
27
balance established by the Treaty.

The ECJ replied that "the existence and extent of State liability for damage
ensuing as a result of a breach of obligations incumbent on the State by virtue of
Community law are questions of Treaty interpretation which fall within the
jurisdiction of the Court., 28 In the absence of an explicit Treaty provision, the
ECJ went on, it had "to rule on such a question in accordance with generally
accepted methods of interpretation, in particular by reference to the
fundamental principles of the Community legal system, and, where necessary,
general principles common to the legal systems of the Member States," pursuant
to the task conferred on it by Article 164 EC (now Article 220 EC).29
The Court then turned to the fact that the second paragraph of Article 215
EC (now Article 288 EC) refers to the general principle common to the laws of
the Member States "that an unlawful act or omission gives rise to an obligation
on public authorities to make good damage caused in the performance of their
duties."3 ° It concluded that the principle of State liability "holds good for any
case in which a Member State breaches Community law, whatever be the organ
of the State whose act or omission was responsible for the breach."'" One will
notice that in Francovich, the ECJ had not followed Advocate General Mischo's
proposal to subject the grant of damages by a national court for a breach of
Community law to the same conditions as the grant of damages by the ECJ for
infringement of that same Community law by a Community institution.32

26

Id,

27

Id,

24 (emphasis added).

28

Id,

25.

29

Id,

27.

30

Id,

28.

31

Brasseriedu Picheurand Factortame,1996 ECR 1-1029,

32

See Francovich, 1991 ECR 1-5357,

20-22.
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The ECJ defined three conditions for State liability: (1) the violated rule
must have been intended to confer rights on individuals, (2) the breach must be
sufficiently serious, and (3) there must be a direct causal link between the breach
of the obligation and the damage sustained.3 3 For the sake of order, it may be
added that the Court clarified shortly after Brasseriein Joined Cases Dillenkofer &
Others v Germany that "the condition that there should be a sufficiently serious
breach, although not expressly mentioned in Francovicb,was nevertheless evident
from the circumstances of that case." 34 The second condition, that there is a
sufficiently serious breach, is the same with regard to the Community's liability
under Article 215 EC (now Article 288 EC) and to Member State liability.3 5
III. SVEINBJORNSDOTTIR: RECOGNITION OF STATE LIABILITY
IN EEA LAW
A. SECURING HOMOGENEITY AS A MAIN GOAL OF THE EEA
AGREEMENT
The EEA Agreement aims to extend the EC single market rules-that is,
large parts of harmonized EC economic law and the provisions concerning
fundamental freedoms, competition, and state aid law-as far as possible to the
contracting EFTA states.3 6 Technically speaking, the EC and its Member States
form one pillar of the EEA and the participating EFTA States form the other.
The two pillars contain separate legal orders and separate enforcement
mechanisms but the law in both pillars is largely identical in substance. In order
to secure a homogeneous development of the case law in the EEA, Article 6 of
the EEA obliges the EFTA Court to interpret the provisions of the EEA
Agreement, insofar as they are identical in substance to corresponding rules of
Community law, in conformity with the relevant rulings of the ECJ given prior
to the date of signature of this Agreement.3 7 Under the second paragraph of
Article 3 of the Agreement concluded by the EFTA States (Surveillance and

33
34

Brasserie du Picheurand Factortame, 1996 ECR 1-1029, 51.
Erich Dienkofer Others v Germany,Joined Cases C-178/94, C-179/94, C-188/94, C-189/94, and C190/94, 1996 ECR 1-4845,

35
36

23 (Oct 8, 1996).

See Brasseriedu Pheurand Factortame,1996 ECR 1-1029, 55.
Case E-1 /03, 2003 EFTA Court Report 143,
See EFTA Suneillance Autboity v Iceland,

27 (Dec 12,

2003); Maqgareihe Ospelt and Schissle Weissenberg Familiensifung Case C-452/01, 2003 ECR 1-9743, 1
29 (Sept 23, 2003); Agreement on the European Economic Area, OJ (L 1) 3 at art 1 (naming
"respect of the same rules" as one of the aims of the Agreement) (cited in note 8).
37

Agreement on the European Economic Area, OJ (L 1) 3 at art 6 (cited in note 8).
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Court Agreement, "SCA" ),3" on the same day as the EEA Agreement was
signed-May 2, 1992-the EFTA Court must, in the interpretation and
application of EEA law, give due weight to the principles laid down by the ECJ's
relevant rulings given after that date. The politically important distinction
between old and new case law has been largely qualified in the EFTA Court's
practice.39
B. THE DISCUSSION IN ACADEMIC LITERATURE
From the beginning, the question was discussed whether the ECJ's
judgments acknowledging State liability were relevant rulings within the meaning
of Article 6 of the EBA and Article 3 of the SCA. 40 The rules laid down in the
EEA Agreement appeared to send mixed signals with regard to the issue of
whether direct effect and primacy were part of EBA law. On the one hand, the
EBA Agreement emphasizes the significance of establishing a dynamic and
homogeneous EBA based on common rules and equal conditions of
competition and providing for adequate means of enforcement, including at the
judicial level, and the Agreement stresses the importance of achieving such an
establishment on the basis of equality and reciprocity with an overall balance of
benefits, rights and obligations for the Contracting Parties. It also highlights the
important role of individuals through the exercise of the rights conferred on
them by the agreement and through the judicial defense of these rights, as well
as the need to create a level playing field for individuals and economic operators
in both EEA pillars also at the judicial level.4' On the other hand, Article 7 EEA,
unlike Article 249 EC, does not provide that the regulations contained in its
annexes are to be "directly applicable" in the EFTA States.42 Protocol 35
stipulates that "[f]or cases of possible conflicts between implemented EEA rules
and other statutory provisions, the EFTA States undertake to introduce, if

38

Agreement Between the EFTA States on the Establishment of a Surveillance Authority and a
Court ofJustice, oJ (L 344/1) 3 art 3 (Dec 31, 1994) ("SCA").

39

See Carl Baudenbacher, The EFTA Court--Legal Framework and Case Law § 2.2 (Luxembourg 3d ed
2008),
available
online
at
<http://www.eftacourt.int/images/uploads/LegalFrameworkFinalweb.pdf> (visited Mar 3, 2009) (noting that the EFTA Court has found ECJ court
rulings relevant where the provisions of the Community law and the SCA are identical in substance,
even though it was not required to follow the case law under the SCA).

40

See, for example, Carl Baudenbacher, Between Homogeneity and Independence: The Legal Position of the
EFTA Court in the European Economic Area, 3 Colum J Eur L 169, 199-200 n 116 (1997); Sven
Norberg, et al, EEA Law: A Commentary on the EEA Agreement 207 (Fritzes 1993).
Agreement on the European Economic Area, OJ (L 1)3 at Recitals 4, 8 and 15 of the Preamble

41

(cited in note 8).
42

Compare id, art 7, with the Treaty Establishing the European Community, 1997 OJ (C 340) 3 art
29, 249 (Nov 10, 1997).
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necessary, a statutory provision to the effect that EEA rules prevail in these
43
cases."
C. THE REFERENCE BY THE REYKJAVIK DISTRICT COURT
On November 12, 1997, the Reykjavik District Court referred to the
EFTA Court two questions: First, it requested an Advisory Opinion on whether
Council Directive 80/987/EEC" was to be interpreted to mean that national
legislation may preclude an employee from receiving payment of a wage claim
against an insolvency estate from the State's Wage Guarantee Fund on the
grounds that the employee is a sibling of an owner of 40 percent of the shares in
the insolvent company. Second, presuming the answer to that question was to
the effect that such an employee may not be precluded from receiving payment
of a wage claim, it asked whether the State was liable vis- -vis the employee for
not having adapted national legislation when it became a party to the EEA
Agreement.45 Erla MAria Sveinbjtrnsd6ttir, the plaintiff in the case before the
national court, had been dismissed from her position as an employee at a
machine workshop. 46 The dismissal came with six months' notice and she was
not required to work during the notice period. However, after three months, the
machine workshop was declared insolvent. 47 Ms. Sveinbj6rnsd6ttir filed claims
against both the insolvency estate of the machine workshop and the Icelandic
Wage Guarantee Fund.48 After both claims were rejected, she brought an action
for compensation against the government of Iceland and argued that it was
liable in damages for not having adjusted its national legislation correctly as per
the directive.49
D. THE ATTITUDE OF THE GOVERNMENTS AND OF THE
EUROPEAN COMMISSION
The governments of Iceland and Norway (EFTA States) and Sweden (an
EC State) submitted that the EEA Agreement did not oblige the EFTA States to

43

Agreement on the European Economic Area: Protocol on the Implementation of EEA Rules, OJ
(L 1) 205, 205 (an 1, 1994).

44

Council Directive 80/987/EEC is part of EEA law according to point 24 of Annex XVIII to the
EEA Agreement.

45

Erla Mdria Sveinbjornsddtiir v Iceland, Case E-9/97, 1998 EFTA Court Report 95,
1998).

46

Id,

47

Id.

48

Id, T 3.

49

Id,

1, 7 (Dec 10,

2.

4-6.
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pay compensation for damages caused to individuals by failure to implement
EEA legislation correctly into their national legislation."0 The ECJ's state-liability
case law could not, in their view, be transferred to the EEA Agreement because
it was based on special characteristics of the Community legal order that were
not present in the EEA Agreement.5 ' In other words, they argued that the case
law was not relevant within the meaning of Articles 6 EEA and 3(2) SCA.12 With
regard to the alleged fundamental differences between the nature of the EEA
Agreement and that of the EC Treaty, the three governments referred in
particular to the ECJ's Opinion 1/91, arguing that the EEA Agreement was an
international treaty which created rights and obligations only between the
features (direct effect and
contracting parties but lacked the supranational
53
law.
Community
primacy) that characterize
The Icelandic government, taking essentially the same position as the
governments of Germany, the United Kingdom, Italy, and the Netherlands in
Francovich, submitted that the only possible basis for State liability could be the noncontractual liability principles of national law. 4 A second parallel exists with
regard to the issue of whether State liability could only be introduced by the
"treatygiver." This allocation of powers argument was put forward in Brasserie by
the German government.55 In Sveinbjirnsddtlir,Iceland made a similar contention
and submitted that the matter was for the contracting parties-the
governments-to decide.56 It explicitly stated that if homogeneity should be
affected by the absence of State liability, the matter would have to "be dealt with
politically and through diplomatic channels as set out particularly in Articles 105
on homogeneity and dispute settlement-and not
to 111 EEA-the provisions
5' 7
Court.
by the EFTA
The European Commission submitted that in Community law, the
principle of State liability rested on three pillars: the notion of the "own legal
order" of the Community, the role of national courts in the enforcement of this
8
order, and the good faith obligation in Article 5 EC (now Article 10 EC).5 The
European Commission argued that the fourth, eighth, and fifteenth recitals of
50

Sveinbjbrnsdottir,1998 EFTA Court Report 95,

51

Id.

44.

52

Id.

53

Erla Maria Sveinbtimnrddtiir v Iceland, Case E-9/97, Report for the Hearing, 1998 EFTA Court
54, 67, 79 (Dec 10, 1998).
Report 115,

54

Id, $ 52.

55
56

See Brasseriedu Picheurand Factortame,1996 ECR 1-1029 at 24.
See Sveinbjrnsddtir,Report for the Hearing, 1998 EFTA Court Report 115 at

57

Id.

58

Id,

94.
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the Preamble to the EEA Agreement especially go a long way in the direction of
an EC-like organization, but that "the body of the Agreement, in particular
Article 7 EEA and Protocol 35 EEA, makes it quite clear that the EFTA States
did not want to create a second EC when they co-operated in the creation of the
EEA."' 9 In this context, the Commission also referred to the ECJ's Opinion
1/91.60 The Commission concluded that elements of an "own legal order" and
of direct effect were not present in the EEA, and therefore the basis for State
liability was lacking.'
E. THE ATTITUDE OF THE EFTA SURVEILLANCE AUTHORITY
The EFTA Surveillance Authority (which plays a similar role in the
proceedings of the EFTA Court as the European Commission in the
proceedings before the ECJ) noted the similarities between the EEA Agreement
and the EC Treaty, the homogeneity objective of the EEA Agreement, and the
important role played by individuals through the exercise of their rights in
judicial proceedings. In view of these considerations, the EFTA Surveillance
Authority submitted that the obligations undertaken by the EFTA States
included a duty to pay compensation for damages caused to individuals by
incorrect implementation of EEA legislation.62 It would, in the EFTA
Surveillance Authority's view, clearly not be an equal treatment of individuals
and economic operators as set out in the fifteenth recital of the Preamble to the
EEA Agreement, "if different rules were to apply with regard to the possibilities
of being compensated for losses resulting from a failure to correctly implement a
directive."6 3
F. THE EFTA COURT'S ANSWER
In its judgment on December 10, 1998, the EFTA Court answered in the
negative the question of whether Council Directive 80/987/EEC allows
national legislation to preclude an employee from receiving payment of a wage
claim against an insolvency estate from the State's Wage Guarantee Fund on the
grounds that the employee is a sibling of an owner of 40 percent of the shares in
the insolvent company. 64 The second question, whether the State was liable visA-vis the employee for not having adapted national legislation when it became a
59

Id,

60

Id at $ 96.

61

See id, TT 95-96.

94-96.

62 See Sveinbrmsddftr, 1998 EFTA Court Report 95,

45.

63

Sveinbjo'rnsddlir,Report for the Hearing, 1998 EFTA Court Report 115, $ 84.

(A

Sveinbjornsddtir, 1998 EFTA Court Report 95,

42.
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party to the EEA Agreement, was answered in the affirmative." The EFTA
Court held that in the absence of an express provision in the EEA Agreement,
the question arose whether such a State obligation was to be derived from the
purposes and the legal structure of the EEA Agreement.6 6 The court referred
first to the general aim of the EEA Agreement, as laid down in Article 1, to
create a homogeneous European Economic Area.67 Secondly, the EFTA Court
quoted the fourth and fifteenth recitals of the Preamble to the EEA Agreement,
68
which emphasize the goal of establishing a dynamic and homogeneous EEA.
Moreover, the EFTA Court pointed to the identity in substance of EC and EEA
law and to the mechanisms for ensuring homogeneous interpretation and
application of the law in both EEA pillars. 69 The EFTA Court also referred to
the important objective of the EEA Agreement: "to ensure individuals and
economic operators equal treatment and equal conditions of competition, as well
as adequate means of enforcement."" It noted that "the provisions of the EEA
Agreement are, to a great extent, intended for the benefit of individuals and
economic operators throughout the European Economic Area" and that "the
proper functioning of the EEA Agreement is dependent on those individuals
and economic operators being able to rely on the rights thus intended for their
benefit.""1
The EFTA Court concluded that "the homogeneity objective and the
objective of establishing the right of individuals and economic operators to equal
treatment and equal opportunities were so strongly expressed in the EEA
2
Agreement" that State liability was to be deemed a part of EEA law. With
regard to the implementation of directives integrated into the EEA Agreement,
this meant that the contracting parties had a duty to compensate for any loss or
damage resulting from the incorrect implementation of those directives. A
further basis for State liability was found in Article 3 of the EEA Agreement,
under which the contracting parties are required to take all appropriate
measures, whether general or particular, to ensure fulfilment of their obligations
under the Agreement. 3 With these holdings, the EFTA Court implicitly rejected
the arguments that State liability could only be based on national law and that
65.

65

Id,

66

Id,

67

Id,

1147-48.

68

Id,

50-51.

69

Sveinbj'rnsddttir,1998 EFTA Court Report 95,

70

Id,

71

Id,

58.

72

Id,

60.

73

Id, 61. Article 3 of the EEA Agreement mirrors Article 10 EC.

47.

56.

57.
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such responsibility could only be introduced by the contracting parties. With regard
to the latter issue, one must notice that it has not been possible to have the EEA
Agreement amended in the fifteen years of its existence. The EFTA Court finally
added that it followed from Article 7 EEA and Protocol 35 that "the EEA
Agreement [did] not entail a transfer of legislative powers," but that "the
principle of State liability must be seen as an integral part of the EEA
74
Agreement as such.
As to the conditions for State liability, the EFTA Court reiterated the ones
75
formulated by the ECJ in Brasseriewithout mentioning that judgment.
IV. ACCEPTANCE OF SVEINBJORNSDOTTIR
A. ACADEMIA
Generally speaking, the EFTA Court's Sveinbj'rnsddttir jurisprudence has
been well received in academic literature. 6 Critical voices have not so much
focused on the Court's basic approach, but rather on some alleged
contradictions in the reasoning. 7 Others argued that Sveinbjbrnsddttir was of
major importance, but that full reciprocity between the two EEA pillars would
only be achieved once the EFTA Court would also recognize direct effect and
the primacy of EEA law over conflicting national law, 71 "possibly in a slightly
74

Sveinbjiirnsddttir,1998 EFTA Court Report 95,

75

Id, In 64-69.
See, for example, Lennart Ritter, W. David Braun, and Francis Rawlinson, EC Competition Law, A
Practitioner's Guide 10 (Kluwer 2d ed 2000); John Forman, The EEA Agreement Five Years on:
Dynamic Homogeneity in Practice and its Implementation by the Two EEA Courts, 36 Common Mkt L Rev
751, 774-76 (1999) (noting that Sveinyb'rnsddttir opened the door for an expansion of the "direct
effect" doctrine); EditorialComments, European Economic Area and European Communiy: Homogeneity of
Legal Orders?, 36 Common Mkt L Rev 697, 700-01 (1999) (observing that the Sveinbjtirnsddtir
ruling and the EC Court's endorsement of the outcome, via Rechberger, allows State liability under
the EEA Agreement to be similar in scope to the liability under the EC's Francoicb); Thomas
Bruha, Is the EEA an Internal Market?, in Peter-Christian Miiller-Graff and Erling Selvig, eds,
EEA-EU Relations 97, 123-24 (Berlin Verlag 1999) (characterizing the EFTA Court's decision in
Sveinbjornsddttiras a "pragmatic solution" which leaves untouched the sensible aspects of direct
effect and primacy of EEA law and the question of whether the primacy issue must be derived
from Article 6 EEA).
See Martin Eyj6lfsson, B. EFTA Court, 37 Common Mkt L Rev 191, 197-98 (2000); Forman, 36
Common Mkt L Rev at 777 (cited in note 76); EditorialComments, 36 Common Mkt L Rev at 700
(cited in note 76). These sources all allege that the statement in paragraph 63 of the EFTA Court's
Svein b'dmsddttirjudgment,"It follows from Article 7 EEA and Protocol 35 to the EEA Agreement
that the EEA Agreement does not entail a transfer of legislative powers," does not harmonize
with the recognition of a new legal order.
See Leif Sev6n, The ECJ,the EFTA Court and the National Courts of the EFTA Countries, in Rettsteori
og Rettsl'v 721, 730 (Festskrift til Carsten Smith 2002) ('In my view, the application of the principle
of State liability can thus never be a substitute for, but is rather a complement to, the application
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Professor Thomas Bruha, who had been a consultant to the
Government of the Principality of Liechtenstein during the EEA negotiations,
welcomed the basic holding in Sveinbjornsddttir, but criticized that the EFTA
Court performed some sort of an egg dance which may be explained by a certain
considerateness toward the distinct dualistic view of the EEA legal order in the
Scandinavian countries. 80 The EFTA Surveillance Authority's first President,
Knut Almestad, welcomed the EFTA Court's SveinbjOrnsddttir judgment as "a
landmark decision." 81

modified form.,

79

B. ECJ
Important support for the EFTA Court also came from the ECJ, which in

Walter RechbeTger and others v Austria82 was asked by the Landesgericht Linz whether
the principle of State liability applied in Austria after January 1, 1994 in view of
the fact that Austria had become an EEA/EFTA state on that date. Austria had
not implemented the Package Tour Directive in good time and travelers had
suffered damage.83 On January 1, 1995, the country had joined the European
Union.8 4 In view of the planned accession of four of them to the EU, the five
EEA/EFTA states had entered into an agreement on transitional arrangements for
a period after the accession of certain EFTA states to the EU on September 28,
1994." According to Article 5 of this agreement, after accession new preliminary-

ruling proceedings could be brought before the EFTA Court only in cases in which

of the principles of direct effect and primacy.'). See also Sven Norberg, Perspectives on the Future
Development of the EEA Agreement, Afmcisrit Thdr Vilhjzilmsson 367 (Orators 2002). In favor of direct
effect and primacy, see also Thomas Bruha, Is the EEA an InternalMarket?at 123 (cited in note
76).
79

80

Leif Sev6n and Martin Johansson, The Protection of the R'ghts of Individuals under the ERA Agreement,
24 Eur L Rev 373, 385 (1999).
Thomas Bruha, EFTA-Gerichtshofanerkennt Staatshaftung bei Verstossgegen EWR-Recht, Eur L Rep 2,
5 (1999).

82

Knut Almestad, The Squaring of the Circle: The Internal Market and the EEA, in Martin Johansson,
Nils Wahl, and Ulf Bernitz, eds, LiberAmicorum in Honour of Sven Norbeig 1, 6 (Bruylant 2006); see
also Thr se Blanchet, Le Succvs Sikncieux de Dix Ans d'Espace E conomique Europien: Un Mode pour
l'Avenir avec d'Autres Voisins?, in Johansson, Wahl, and Bernitz, eds, IberAmicorum 101, 113.
Walter Rechbeger and others vAustria, Case C-140/97, 1999 ECR 1-3499 Oune 15, 1999).

83

Id, 117.

84

Act concerning the conditions of accession of the Kingdom of Norway, the Republic of Austria,
the Republic of Finland and the Kingdom of Sweden and the adjustments to the Treaties on
which the European Union is founded, OJ (C 241/09) 21 (Aug 29, 1994), available online at
<http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/treaties/dat/11994N/htm/11994N.html> (visited Jun 3, 2009)
(requiring Austria to comply with the conditions of accession by January 1, 1995).

81

85

Agreement on transitional arrangements for a period after the accession of certain EFTA States to the
European Union, 1994-1995 EFTA Court Report 161 (Sept 28, 1994).
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the facts occurred before accession and
the application was lodged with the court
6
accession.1
after
months
three
within
Under Article 7 of the transitional Agreement, the EFTA Court of five judges
was to conclude all pending cases within six months of accession." This agreement
paid insufficient account to the interests of individuals and economic operators. It
seems that the governments of the departing EFTA states did not care about that
failure, but rather wanted to save the money which would have been necessary for
the perpetuation of the five-member court over a reasonable period of time. The
result was that the jurisdiction of the EFTA court to hear the case had been
excluded. In its ruling of June 15, 1999, the ECJ held that Austria was, according
to EEA Article 7 and in conjunction with Section 11 of Protocol 1 to the EEA
Agreement, required to transpose the directive in question on the day the EEA
Agreement entered into force: January 1, 1994.88 However, the ECJ declared
itself incompetent to rule on a question of interpretation related to the Austrian
application of the EEA Agreement during the period preceding its accession to
the Community. 9 That Austria subsequently ascended to the European Union did
not change anything. The ECJ went on, however, stating:
Moreover, in view of the objective of uniform interpretation and application
which informs the EEA Agreement, it should be pointed out that the
principles governing the liability of an EFTA State for infringement of a
directive referred to in the EEA Agreement were the subject of the EFTA
Court's judgment of 10 December 1998 in Sveinbj6rnsd6ttir. 90
With this statement, the ECJ made it clear that it was aware of the
protection gap created by the EFTA governments. The Common Market Law
Review stated in its Editorial Comments, "This is more than a 'coup de chapeau', a
salute to the EFTA Court."9' It went on to conclude, "With this statement, it is
important to note, the EC Court appears to endorse the EFTA Court's
judgment." 92 John Forman, a head of unit in the Commission's legal service who
has pleaded a considerable number of cases before the EFTA Court (albeit not
Sveinbj'rnsddttir), spoke of "express endorsement" and pointed out that the ECJ
also made reference to the principle of uniformity as regards the interpretation
and application of the EEA Agreement.93 Th~rse Blanchet, a former member

86

Id.

87

Id.

88

Rechberger, 1999 ECR 1-3499,

89

Id, 38.

90

Id,

91
92

Ed'toialComments, 36 Common Mkt L Rev at 700-01 (cited in note 76).
Id at 700.

93

Forman, 36 Common Mkt L Rev at 777 n 151 (cited in note 76).
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of the legal service of the EFTA Secretariat, stated that the ECJ "a ent&in6 de
94
manire lapidaire cette interpretation dans son arrt 'Rechberge?." It appears that
compensation was in fact paid in the framework of a settlement before the
referring Austrian court.95
C. ICELANDIC SUPREME COURT
In Sveinbjdrnsdd#ir, the referring Reykjavik District Court accepted the
principle of State liability. It found that the conditions for liability were fulfilled
and granted the plaintiff compensation. On December 16, 1999, the Supreme
Court of Iceland confirmed that judgment on appeal.96 The Supreme Court
formally took notice of the EFTA Court's opinion, but it did not deviate from
the dualistic approach as it relied partially on the domestic tort law to establish
liability. State liability in Icelandic law thus derives from two sources: the
implementation of the EEA Agreement into domestic law and, according to
Sveinbjdrnsddttir,the liability inherent in the EEA Agreement as such. In any case,
the outcome fully corresponded with the EFTA Court's Sveinbjdimsd6ttirruling.
D. GOVERNMENTS
Acceptance by Governments was not facilitated by the fact that, in
Sveinbj'rnsddttir,the European Commission had argued against EEA State liability
9
and in doing so had based its argument, inter alia, on Opinion 1/91. ' The
Commission's position actually came somewhat unexpectedly, since in the EFTA
Court's very first case, Ravintoloitsijain Laiton Kustannus Oy Restamark v Helsingin
Piiritullikamari,it had straightforwardly advised the EFTA Court to acknowledge
direct effect of Article 16 EEA without even mentioning Opinion 1/91. The
Commission submitted in that case
that the Contracting Parties have emphasized the importance of the role
played by individuals in the EEA through the exercise of the rights
94

95

96

97

Thr&se Blanchet, Le succds sikndeux de dix ans d{Espace economique europien at 115 ("in its Rechbeiger
judgment has confirmed this interpretation in a rather lapidary way," author's translation) (cited in

note 81).
See Georg Gorton, Staatsbaftungim EFTA-Pfeikr des EWR: Zusammenspiel von EuGH und EFTA-GH,
Eur L Rep 321, 323 (1999); Christine Stix-Hackl, Europa-Seiten im 5-Jahres-Spieg, 8 Osterreichisches
Anwaltsblatt 440, 468 (Aug 2000); Carl Baudenbacher, Staatshaftung im gesamlen Europdischen
Wirtschaftsraum:EuGHund EFTA-Gerichtshofim Doppe~ass, 10 Europiisches Wirrschafts & Steuerrecht
425 (2000).
Judgment of the Supreme Court of 16 December 1999, /lenska rikia v Erlu Mariu Sveinibjrnsddtir,
Case No 236/1999, Hxstirettur Islands Report 4916 (Dec 16, 1999) (Iceland).
See Sveinbjbrnsddtnir, Report for the Hearing, 1998 EFTA Court Report 115, 96 (citing Opinion
1/91 as support for its assertion that the Member States did not intend to create a binding
"superior legal order'.
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conferred upon them by the Agreement and through the judicial defence of
these rights (eighth recital of the Preamble to the Agreement). This indicates
that the provisions of the EEA Agreement, despite its differences with the
EC Treaty, are capable of producing direct effect and so may be relied upon
by individuals before national courts in the legal orders of the EFTA
98
States.
The EFTA Court in Restamark avoided a direct answer to the question of whether
provisions of the EEA Agreement are capable of having direct effect. It held that it
is inherent in Protocol 35 that individuals and economic operators must be
entitled to invoke and claim at the national level any rights that could be derived
from the provisions of the EEA Agreement as being or having been made part
of the respective national legal order if those rights are unconditional and
sufficiently precise. For the sake of completeness, it may be added that the
EFTA Court used the same approach when dealing with the primacy issue. In
the Einarsson case,99 the Court found that, based on Protocol 35, the
implemented EEA rules are sufficiently precise and unconditional to be invoked
in national courts and take precedence over conflicting rules of national law.'0 0
There was another factor which may have weakened the persuasive power
of Sveinbjrnsdtir.At the 1999 Nordic Law Conference in Oslo, the JudgeRapporteur in Sveinbjornsddttir when speaking about that case criticized the

Court's Statute for lacking a dissenting opinion system by saying that he found
"itvery difficult to function if we [the judges], if the occasion arises, are not
given the opportunity to give 'a dissenting, or even concurring opinion.' One is
bound by the majority, not only with regard to the conclusion, but also with
regard to the reasoning leading to the conclusion."'0 1 He then added that he did
"not intend to break this rule by saying something which could be interpreted as
a further reasoning."'0 2 Finally, he called part of the Court's reasoning in
Sveinbj'rnsddttiran act "ultra vires."' 103
On April 6, 2001, the Reykjavik District Court referred another State
liability case to the EFTA Court: E-4/01, Karlsson.10 4 That case again involved a
98

Ravintooitsiain Ituon Kustannus Oy Restamark v Helsingin Piifitullikamari,Case E-1 /94, Report for the
Hearing, 1994-1995 EFTA Court Report 15, 96.

99
100

Hbrdur Einarssonv Iceland, Case E-1 /01, 2002 EFTA Court Report 1 (Feb 22, 2002).
Id, T 51-55.

101

Reltspresident i EFTA-domstolen Bjam Haug, Noge /intevenion of EFTA Court President Bjorn HaugL,
Forhandlingene ved Det 35. nordiske juristmotet i Oslo [Proceedings of the 35th Nordic Law Meeting
in
Oslo],
1005
(Aug
18-20,
1999),
available
online
at
<http://cms.ku.dk//upload/application/pdf/f563aae9/3551.pdf> (visited Mar 4, 2009). As in the
ECJ, there are no dissents allowed in the EFTA Court

102

Id.

103

Id at 1006.

104

KarlK Karlsson v Iceland, Case E-4/01, 2002 EFTA Court Report 241,

1 (May 30, 2002).
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private operator suing the Icelandic government.'0 5 Iceland had not abolished its
state alcohol import monopoly by January 1, 1994, the date the EEA Agreement
entered into force.10 6 The Karlsson firm was therefore prevented from importing
and distributing alcoholic beverages into Iceland.'1 7 The EFTA Court held that
Iceland had violated Article 16 EEA, the provision mirroring Article 31 (1) EC. 1°8
The Norwegian government, presenting observations under Article 20 of
the Court's Statute and Article 97 of the Rules of Procedure Government, went
for a rematch. It used this opportunity to urge the EFTA Court to overrule
Sveinbjo'rnsddtir.10 9 Referring to Brasserie, the Norwegian government submitted
that in Community law, the principle of State liability was inseparable from the
principle of direct effect, with both principles constituting complementary
elements of the supranational Community law-principles that the government
claimed to be absent in EEA law."0 Moreover, the Norwegian government
contended that in Brasserie, the ECJ based its finding of State liability on the
existence of liability of the Community institutions under Article 288 EC, a
provision that it claimed had no parallel in EEA law."' It was also argued that
the goal of the EEA Contracting Parties to establish a dynamic and
homogeneous European Economic Area implied a certain job sharing between
the EFTA Court and the governments, so to speak. According to this view, it
was the responsibility solely of the contracting parties to see that the goal of
establishing a dynamic EEA was achieved. The EFTA Court's task would be to
secure the homogeneous development of the law in the EEA.12 The Norwegian
government also tried to downplay the significance of the ECJ's reference to the
EFTA Court's SveinbjdrnsddtlirinRechberger." 3 The government submitted that the
citation amounted only to dicta, because the ECJ had denied its competence to
interpret the EEA Agreement." 4 In that view, the ECJ did nothing more than to
take note of the fact that the question of State liability had been dealt with in
Sveinbji'rnsddttir,but did not approve the EFTA Court's ruling in that case." 5
105

Id,

106

Id,

107

Id,

108 Id,

7.
4,6.
5-6.
23.

109 Karlsson, Case E-4/01, Report for the Hearing, 2002 EFTA Court Report 254,

2002).
110 Id, IN 54, 71.
M1 Id, 72.
Karsson,Transcript of the Oral Hearing, 33, on file with the EFTA Court.

112
113

Id.

114

Id.

115

Id.
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In its judgment of May 30, 2002, the EFTA Court noted the reference in
Rechbetger and it confirmed its Sveinbjo'rnsd6tlir jurisprudence." 6 The Court held
that EC-law-style direct effect was absent in EEA law, but that this did not
preclude the existence of an obligation on the State to pay compensation for loss
and damage caused to individuals and economic operators as a result of breaches
of obligations under the EEA Agreement." 7 It also rejected the argument put
forward by the Norwegian government that the concept of EEA State liability
must be limited to incorrect implementation of directives.' 18 In fact, the EFTA
Court had already found in Sveinbjdrnsdttir that "it is a principle of the EEA
Agreement that the Contracting Parties are obliged to provide for compensation
for loss and damage cause[d] to individuals by breaches of the obligations under
the EEA Agreement for which the EFTA States can be held responsible."'" 9 The
EFTA Court therefore ruled that compensation must be paid for breaches of
obligations under EEA law if the three conditions defined in Sveinbjdrnsddttir
were met. 20 Again, the EFTA Court did not make reference to ECJ Brasserie on
that point.
As far as the conditions in question are concerned, the EFTA Court ruled
that Article 16 EEA (which corresponds to Article 31 EC) confers rights upon
individuals for which they may seek the protection of national courts.' 2' Unlike
in Sveinbjiornsddtlir,the EFTA Court itself answered the question of whether there
was a sufficiently serious breach of EEA law, and the answer was in the
affirmative. 2 2 The Court did so because it had been clear long before the entry
into force of the EEA Agreement that a state import monopoly was
incompatible with European law.' 23 The Icelandic government, having
negotiated, drafted, signed, and ratified the EEA Agreement, was in the best
position to assess the legislative amendments required to comply therewith and
there was sufficient time between the signature of the EEA Agreement and its

116

Karlsson, 2002 EFTA Court Report 241,

117

Id, M25-34.

118 Id,

25.

31-32.

119 Sveinbd'rnsddttir,1998 EFTA Court Report 95,

62.

120

Karlsson, 2002 EFTA Court Report 241,

121

Id,

32.

122

Id.

123

See PubblicoMinister v FlaviaMangberaand others, Case C-59/75, 1976 ECR 91 (Feb 3, 1976) (holding as
early as 1976 that Article 37(1) of the EEC Treaty requires Member States to eliminate the exclusive
right to import from other Member States).

37.
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entry into force. 124 Whether there existed a causal link was left to the national
court to decide. 25
The Norwegian Government gave up its resistance against State liability
126
after the EFTA Court decided StorebrandSkadeforsikringAS v Veronika Finanger.
The case began as a lawsuit in the Norwegian court system: Veronika Finanger
had taken a ride in a motor vehicle driven by an intoxicated driver, and the
driver's insurer refused compensation invoking 5 7 para 3 litra b of the
Norwegian Automobile Liability Act. 27 That provision denies insurance
protection to a passenger who rides in a car driven by an intoxicated driver and
knows or must have known that the driver was intoxicated. 128 Veronika Finanger
nevertheless brought an action for payment against the driver's insurance
9
company.

12

Upon reference from the Norwegian Supreme Court, the EFTA Court
held in 1999 that the provision was incompatible with the EEA Motor Vehicle
Insurance Directives. 130 The Supreme Court concurred with the EFTA Court's
ruling by finding that Norway had mis-implemented the Directives in question
and was therefore in breach of EEA law.' 31 Veronika Finanger's claim against
the driver's private insurance company was, however, rejected because the
majority of the Supreme Court felt that it could not bring an unambiguous
provision of Norwegian law into line with a conflicting provision of an EEA law
Directive in a horizontal context.1 32 Ms. Finanger then brought a second action,
this time for compensation against the Norwegian State based on the EFTA
Court's State liability jurisprudence. She obtained a favorable judgment in the
Oslo City Court but lost before the Court of Appeal. 133 In its judgment of
October 28, 2005, the Norwegian Supreme Court followed the EFTA Court's
State liability jurisprudence and granted her compensation. 134 The government
argued that the breach in question-the mis-implementation of the Motor

124

Karlsson, 2002 EFTA Court Report 241,

45.

125

Karlson,2002 EFTA Court Report 241,

126

Storebrand Skadeforsikring AS v Veronika Finanger, Case E-1/99, 1999 EFTA Court Report 119

127

(Nov 17, 1999).
Id, T7 2-4.

128

Id, T 4.

129

Id, 73.

130

Id, 736.

131

Finanger,Case No 55/1999, HR-2000-00049B 1811 (Nov 16, 2000) (Norway).

132

Id.

133

FinangerII,Case No 2005/412, HR-2005-01690-P 1365 (Oct 28, 2005) (Norway).

134

Id at 1365.
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a sufficiently serious breach.
Vehicle Insurance Directives-did not constitute
35
The Supreme Court did not accept that view.'
E. SWEDISH SUPREME COURT
On November 26, 2004, the Swedish Supreme Court held in WdkerdsAndersson v Svenska stalen'3 6 that Sweden was liable to pay compensation to two
workers who had suffered damages caused by the incorrect implementation of
the Directive 80/987/EEC in Sweden in 1994, the year Sweden became an
EEA/EFTA country. In doing so, the Supreme Court made reference, inter alia,
to the EFTA Court's judgments in Sveinbjbirnsddttir and13 7in Karlsson as well as to
the Icelandic Supreme Court's ruling in Sveinbjdrnsddttir.
The ECJ's Andersson case has an interesting procedural history in relation to
Rechbeger. The Stockholm City Court, which had to deal with Andersson's claims,
referred essentially the same questions to the ECJ under the Article 234 EC
procedure as the Austrian court did in RechbeTrer. The ECJ handed down both
rulings on the same day-June 15, 1999.138 As in RechbeTger, the ECJ denied its
competence to rule on the question of whether the EEA Agreement applies to a
member state during the period preceding its accession to the Community; that is,
whether the Swedish State was liable for damages caused to individuals and
economic operators by its misimplementation of a directive.1 39 Unlike in Rechberger,
the ECJ in Andersson did not make reference to the legal situation created in the
EFTA states by the EFTA Court's Sveinsbjirnsddttirruling. The reasons for the
unequal course of action in the two cases are unknown. One will not, however,
overlook that the composition of the ECJ differed in the two cases. Both cases
were decided in plenary session: Rechberger by what at the time was called the
small plenum, which consisted of nine judges, and Andersson by the big plenum,
which was made up of eleven judges. The Swedish judge Hans Ragnemalm
participated in Andersson, but not in Rechberger. The Italian judge Federico
Mancini participated in Rechberger, but not in Andersson.4 ° The Stockholm City

135

Id.

136 Case No T 2593-01 (Nov 26, 2004) (Sweden).
137 Id. See also the review by Martin Johansson, State Liability within the EEA from a Swedish Perspective SveinkbirnsddttirConfirmed, 2 Eur L Rep 50, 52 (2005).
138

Ulla-Brith Andersson and Susannne Wakerds-Andersson v Sweden, 1999 ECR 1-3551 (une 15, 1999);
Rechberger 1999 ECR 1-3499.
30-33.
139 Wdkerds-Andersson v Sweden, 1999 ECR 1-3551,
140 The renowned Swedish newspaper Svenska Dagbladet alleged that Mr. Ragnemalm had seen to it
that the ECJ did not quote Sveinbjbrnsddttirin order to help his Government. See Svenska Dagbladet
Mdndagen 8 (June 21, 1999).
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Court nevertheless found in favor of the plaintiffs, but the Svea Court of Appeal
reversed.'
It may be added that the injured workers would most probably have
succeeded much earlier had the ECJ referenced the EFTA Court's
jurisprudence. The Supreme Court's ruling was of considerable significance also
beyond the EEA law context. University of Stockholm Law Professor Ulf
Bernitz, one of Sweden's leading academics in the field of European law, noted
that
the Swedish Supreme Court's stance in the Andersson case concerning
liability for damages according to the EEA Agreement has become an
important precedent also in relation to the long disputed issue of the
Swedish courts' possibilities to award damages to be paid by the Swedish
State for violations of the European Convention connected to flaws in
Swedish legislation or practices by Swedish courts or other authorities.142
F. LIECHTENSTEIN SUPREME COURT
Surprisingly, EEA State liability has not so far been accepted by the
Supreme Court of Liechtenstein, even though Liechtenstein is the only
EEA/EFTA State adhering to the monist approach in its constitutional law.
According to monist tradition, international law becomes part of the
domestically applicable law without any additional implementation or
incorporation. 4 3 In August 2005, the Liechtenstein Court of Appeal ruled in
favor of an Austrian physician who had been refused a license to practice in
Liechtenstein and who, after having been successful before the EFTA Court and
the Liechtenstein Supreme Administrative Court with his claim that this
amounted to a breach of the freedom of establishment, had sued the
Liechtenstein government for damages."4 The Court of Appeal did not,

141

Cases T 4064-00, Staten mot WAkeris Anderssom, and T 4065-00 Staten mot Andersson,
judgments delivered on 7 June 2001; see Johansson, 2 Eur L Rep at 51 n 15 (2005) (cited in note

142

143

Ulf Bernitz, The Appication ofEEA Law in Sweden, in Mario Monti, et al, eds, Economic Law andJusice in
Times of Glbal'zation,FestschrififorCarlBaudenbacher 29, 35-36 (Nomos 2007).
See Anne-Marie Slaughter & William Burke-White, The Future of InternationalLaw is Domestic (Or,

144

The European Way of Law), 47 Harv Intl LJ 327, 327 n 1 (2006); J. G. Collier, Is International Law
Really Partof the Law of England?, 38 Ind & Comp L Q 924, 924-25 (1989). Consider J. G. Starke,
Monism and Dualism in the Theoy of International Law, 17 Brit YB Intl L 66, 70, 74 (1936)
(expounding on Kelsen's characterization of monism, which claims that "the state as a legal
concept is merely a schema serving to embrace the totality of legal norms which apply over
certain persons within a defined territorial area').
Tschanett,Judgment CO.2004.2 (Aug 18, 2005) (Liechtenstein).

137).
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as developed
however, base its judgment on the principles of EEA State liability
Act. 14
by the EFTA Court, but on the national Public Liability
In a judgment on December 7, 2006, the Supreme Court of Liechtenstein
stuck to this approach, but found in favor of the government holding that the
latter had not committed a fault within the meaning of the Liechtenstein Public
Liability Act. 146 Upon appeal, the State Court quashed that judgment.'47 On June
5, 2008, the Supreme Court handed down a second judgment along the same
lines as the first one. 48 It stated that the case had to be dealt with under national
law and reiterated that, in its view, the government had not committed a fault
nor had it acted unlawfully.4 4 The Supreme Court did not even mention the
EFTA Court's state-liability case law, noting only that the EEA's criterion that
the breach be sufficiently serious was identical to the requirements of the
Liechtenstein Public Liability Act.150 It must nevertheless be noted that
according to the case law of the Liechtenstein State Court, EEA law takes
precedence over domestic law. 5' The case has again been appealed to the State
Court.
V. CONCLUSIONS
The EFTA Court summarized its jurisprudence on the mechanisms that
aim to secure member state compliance with EEA law in the case Criminal
proceedings againstA, which concerned the freedom of lawyers to provide services
in Liechtenstein. 5 ' The Court reiterated that "[t]he EEA Agreement is an
international treaty suigeneris" containing a distinct legal order of its own, whose
depth of integration is less far-reaching than under the EC Treaty, but whose

145

Id.

146

Beschluss, Oberster Geichtshof, CO.2004.2-25 (Dec 7, 2006), Jus & News 137 (January 2007). For critical
comments on the Supreme Court's judgment, see Von Bernhard Hofst6tter, Rechtsfehkrhbfte Abweisung
einer EWR-Staatshngsklge alsjudikaives Unrecht?: (Urteildes Obersten Geichtshofs vom 7. De ember 2006

[CO.2004.2-25]),Jus & News 33 (Jan 2007); Constanze Semmelmann, Staatsbaftungin Liechtenstein - en
Sonderweg im EWR: (Fiirstlicher Oberster Gericbtshof Liechtenstein, Urteil vom 7. Deqember 2006,
CO.2004.2- 25), 2007 Eur L Rep 131 (2007).
147 Dr med T v Liechtenstein, StGH 2007/15 (Staatsgerichtshof [State Law Court] acting as
Verfassungsgerichtshof [Constitutional Court] 2007) (Liechtenstein), available online at
<http://www.stgh.li/Inhalte/themen/StgHPDF/StGH2007-15.pdf> (visited Mar 9, 2009).
Judgment CO.2004.2-38 (June 5, 2008) (Liechtenstein).
148
Tscbanet,
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Id.
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Id.

151 S GmbH v C AG, StGH 2006/94 (Staatsgerichtshof [State Law Court] acting
Verfassungsgerichtshof [Constitutional Court] 2008) (Liechtenstein), available online
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scope and objective "go[] beyond what is usual for an agreement under public
international law."1" 3 With regard to the mechanisms that secure homogeneity
between the two EEA pillars, the Court referred to Article 7 and Protocol 35
EEA and stated that it is inherent in the objectives of the EEA Agreement and
in Article 3 EEA that national courts are bound to interpret national law as far
as possible in conformity with EEA law. 1 4 The Court further held that in cases
of conflict between national law and non-implemented EEA law, the contracting
parties may decide whether under their national legal order national
administrative and judicial organs can apply the relevant EEA rule directly and
thereby avoid violation of EEA law in a particular case.' 55 But it also noted that
in cases of violation of EEA law a contracting party is obliged to provide
compensation for loss and damage caused to individuals and economic
operators in accordance with the principle of State liability which is an integral
part of the EEA Agreement, if the conditions laid down in Sveinbjdrnsddtirand
Karlsson are fulfilled.'56
In Celina Nguyen, the EFTA Court once more confirmed its state-liability
jurisprudence.'57 On the first referred question from the Oslo District Court, it
held that the Motor Vehicle Directives precluded an EEA/EFTA State from
maintaining legislation excepting redress for noneconomic loss, such as pain and
suffering, from the compulsory insurance system.'5 8 On a second question
referred by the national court, the EFTA Court found that the exclusion of
redress for noneconomic loss constituted in principle a sufficiently serious
breach of EEA law to entail State liability. 9 That means that, as in Karlsson, the
EFTA Court answered the question whether there was a sufficiently serious
breach of EEA law in the affirmative. The case shows that for the courts in
Norway, State liability has become part of the "courant normal."
In Community law, the principle of State liability has been called the
"fourteen carat gold" example of European judicial lawmaking. 6 ° The same can
be said with regard to EEA law. Particularly in view of the legal nature of the
EEA Agreement, it is understandable that the EFTA Court's Sveinbj'rnsddttir
judgment has caused commotion. But meanwhile, EEA State liability has been
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accepted not only by the courts, but also by the governments of Iceland and
Norway.
According to the EFTA Court's jurisprudence, EEA State liability follows
from the EEA Agreement. With one exception, the EFTA Court has not made
reference in its case law to the ECJ's landmark rulings in Francovich and in
Brasserie.6' It is clear, however, that the recognition of this principle has its basis in
the jurisprudence of the ECJ. One of the reasons that has prompted the EFTA
Court to acknowledge State liability is the fact that the homogeneity objective is
strongly expressed in the EEA Agreement. In Brasserie, the ECJ based its finding
of State liability on the existence of liability for the Community institutions under
Article 215 EC (now Article 288 EC). 62 The EEA's Article 46(2) SCA, mirrors
mutatis mutandis Article 288(2) EC.163 In that respect, academic literature on the
EEA Agreement points to the case law of the ECJ regarding Article 288(2)
EC.16 4 Still, Article 46(2) SCA is, by far, not as important as Article 288(2) EC.
No cases have been brought before the EFTA Court up to now under that
provision. The EFTA Court did not connect its state-liability jurisprudence to
the noncontractual liability of EFTA institutions. This may have implications for
the definition of the "seriousness" condition.
In its Karlsson judgment, the EFTA Court held that:
The finding that the principle of State liability is an integral part of the EEA
Agreement differs, as it must, from the development in the case law of the
Court of Justice of the European Communities of the principle of State
of the principles may not
liability under EC law. Therefore, the application
165
necessarily be in all respects coextensive.
Different conclusions have been drawn from that statement. The
Norwegian government argued before the Norwegian courts in FinangerII, using
paragraph 30 of the EFTA Court's Karlsson ruling, that the second condition for
State liability (the existence of a sufficiently serious breach) was to be seen as
stricter in EEA law than in Community law.'66 The Supreme Court rejected that
argument and held that the conditions for liability were the same in EEA law as
in Community law.' 67 One will notice in Karlsson that the Norwegian government
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had already, as an alternative, proposed a narrower interpretation of the
condition that there must be a sufficiently serious breach under EEA law than
under EC law that would take into account the differences between the two legal
orders.'68 The fact that no legislative powers have been transferred under the
EEA Agreement would indicate that a breach could be regarded sufficiently
serious only in extraordinary circumstances.' 69
On the other hand, it has been suggested in academic literature that
paragraph 30 of the EFTA Court's Karlsson judgment must be interpreted to the
effect that, in view of the homogeneity objective underlying the EEA Agreement
on the one hand and the lack of EC-style direct effect on the other, the
requirements for 7a sufficiently serious breach must be lower in EEA law than in
Community law.' 1
In the sphere of EC law, the principle of State liability has in recent years
developed in a way that makes it part of an emerging body of tort law. 171 In Kob/er,
the ECJ reaffirmed that the principle of State liability was inherent in the system
of the Treaty and applied liability to infringements of Community law
committed by the highest court of a Member State. 72 The three conditions laid
down in Brasserie were held to be applicable, although the requirement of a
"sufficiently serious breach" was modified in light of the particular nature of the
judicial function.1 73 The EFTA Court has not yet dealt with a case of judicial
wrongdoing, but academic literature appears 17to4 assume that the ECJ's Kobler
jurisprudence would equally apply in EEA law.
The ECJ's elaboration of State liability in Community law constitutes an
enlargement of the level of judicial protection provided by direct effect and
supremacy. The possibility of obtaining compensation from the member states is
of particular importance in cases involving the horizontal relations between
private operators in the context of the non-implementation of a directive,
because there is no direct effect in such cases. In EEA law, the principle of State
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liability is not a complement of direct effect and primacy. Rather it must,
together with the maxims of quasi-direct effect (provisions of EEA law that
have been implemented into the legal orders of the EEA/EFTA states may be
invoked before national courts), quasi-primacy (provisions of EEA law that may
be invoked before national courts take primacy over conflicting norms of
domestic law on the EEA/EFTA states), and conforming interpretation,
compensate for the lack of these principles. State liability is therefore even more
important in the EFTA pillar of the EEA than in the EC pillar, because it is a
tool to secure member state compliance.7 5 One may say that in EEA law we do
not have the giant gothic cathedral with the three naves---direct effect, primacy,
and State liability-which is characteristic for EC law. Instead, our construction
resembles a simple Nordic stave church. But worshipping is possible in both
places, with essentially the same results.
Had the EFTA Court not opted for State liability ten years ago, the EEA
Agreement would have become one-sided, with extensive protection of
individuals and economic operators from the EC and the EFTA in the EC pillar
and rather limited safeguards in the EFTA pillar. This would have been
incompatible not only with the homogeneity objective underlying the EEA
Agreement, but also with the legitimate reciprocity expectations of the
Community and of its citizens. To put it bluntly, without the recognition of State
liability, the EEA Agreement and the EFTA Court would never have taken off.
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